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The report describes various data sources 
and their utilization in quantitative marine 
trafﬁc accident modeling. The primary 
interest is on the data sources that cover the 
Gulf of Finland and which could be useful in 
modeling human and organizational causes 
in ship collisions and groundings. The 
sources are analyzed considering the nature, 
quantity, quality and availability of the data, 
and if the data is feasible to quantitative 
accident modeling. It is found that the data 
sources differ in the scope and purpose and 
they all have their strengths and 
weaknesses. The existing sources are not 
perfect and using any of them as the only 
source of input to a quantitative model 
seems risky. The report is a part of the 
research project Competitive Advantage by 
Safety (CAFE). CAFE is funded by the 
European Regional Development Fund, the 
City of Kotka, Finnish Shipowners’ 
Association, Kotka Maritime Research 
Centre corporate group: Aker Arctic 
Technology Inc., the Port of HaminaKotka, 
the Port of Helsinki, Kristina Cruises Ltd, 
and Meriaura Ltd., and the project partners: 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Marine traffic and accidents  
Trade by sea has increased during last century [1]. Reasons lie, amongst 
other things, in technological advancements [1].  More ships are sailing in 
the world seas, the new ones being faster and bigger than the old ones. They 
are more sophisticated than before, and contain much more automation. At 
the same time, there is a shortage of good seamen; BIMCO-ISF 2010 Man-
power Update informed about 13000 officers shortage in 2010 [2]. Howev-
er beneficial to society development is, it still possesses many threats. Acci-
dents at sea still occur, and consequences to people, ship or environment, 
are often greater than before.  
There are various ways to classify marine traffic accidents. As an example, 
in EMCIP database (see Chapter 3.2.3), the accident types are capsiz-
ing/listing, collision, contact, damage to ship or environment, ground-
ing/stranding, fire/explosion, flooding/foundering, hull failure, loss of con-
trol, missing and non-accidental event. The number of accidents occurred 
in the Gulf of Finland ship traffic in 1997-1999 and 2001-2006 are present-
ed in Figure 1. The most common accident types in this sea area had been 
groundings (48 % of all accidents) and collisions of two ships (20 %) [3]. 
Also the consequences of maritime accidents can be expressed in many 
ways. One can examine the consequences to the vessel(s) or other struc-
tures involved in the accident, to the humans either directly or indirectly 
involved in the accident, or the ones to the surrounding nature and envi-
ronment. Further, the magnitude of the consequences can be measured on 
various scales. They can be probabilities or expected values of a variable 
describing the consequences directly, such as the number of injured per-
sons or the amount of oil leaked to the water, or they can be described with 
monetary terms, such as the cost of cleaning the oil spill or the cost of hu-
man life. Although assigning monetary values for the consequences might 
be challenging, it is often necessary. Different types of consequences must 
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be comparable when a cost-benefit analysis of alternative actions or deci-
sions aiming to improve the safety or to mitigate risk is conducted. 
 
1.2 The purpose of accident modeling 
The ultimate goal of accident modeling is to learn more about the accidents 
in order to prevent them in the future. Especially if there is a lot of data on 
accidents available, it might be easier to draw conclusions based on the 
model than based on the raw data itself. Preventing an accident could mean 
minimizing the likelihood of the unwanted event, the magnitude or severity 
of the accident consequences, or it could include both of these elements. 
However, dividing the accident models into models that estimate the likeli-
hood element and to models which address the consequences is a bit mis-
leading, as almost any feature in the accident chain from the design or deci-
sion-making level to the final consequences can be seen as either kind, if 
these starting and ending points can even be defined. For example, the size 
of a hole in the hull after a collision can be estimated probabilistically and it 
has its own consequences, such as an oil leak. Further, an oil leak can be 
seen as the unwanted event with certain harmful consequences to nature, 
for example. Likewise, the unwanted event collision could be seen as a con-
sequence of a certain organizational deficiency.  Nevertheless, accident 
models provide support to decision making and to cost-benefit analyses 
when managing risks and safety. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Marine traffic accident in the Gulf of Finland in 1997-1999 and 2001-2006 [3] 
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Quantitative accident models, which describe a system’s quantities math-
ematically, statistically or computationally, provide a means to cost-benefit 
analysis within risk analysis or safety-related decision making. However, as 
accidents are low probability events, there often is a lack of data necessary 
for the models. To address this shortcoming, there is a growing interest in 
near-miss data. Reasons for this are that near-misses occur more frequent-
ly, but might be partly governed by the same underlying causes and mecha-
nisms as accidents. Hence, a possibility to utilize near-miss data in acci-
dents modeling appears tempting. 
 
1.3 CAFE project 
This report is a part of the research project Competitive Advantage by Safe-
ty (CAFE). CAFE aims to improve the safety, efficiency and competitiveness 
of maritime transportation. A special focus is on human and organizational 
factors and operational safety. The CAFE project tries to strengthen the 
knowledge obtained and shared during the “Development of Maritime Safe-
ty Culture (METKU)” project of the same consortium, where quality and 
environmental standards were compared with the International Safety 
Management Code (ISM Code) and shortcomings in the safety management 
of shipping companies were identified [4]. The CAFE project focuses on 
these shortcomings but also increases specialization to improve the sector’s 
competitiveness. CAFE will look at how: 
1. international experiences from near miss reporting systems could be 
used efficiently 
2. maritime safety statistics could be used as an objective safety indica-
tor 
3. improving occupational safety could enhance the sector’s competi-
tiveness 
4. modeling of safety management could make it possible to focus on a 
few key proprieties and how this focusing could lower the risk for 
maritime accidents 
5. operational safety and human factors have high potential to improve 
safety 
6. “weak signals”, i.e. Corporate Social Responsibility, could be used 
improving the sector’s public image 
7. international networking could strengthen maritime safety on the 
Baltic Sea and in Europe. 
The consortium members in the CAFE project are Kotka Maritime Re-
search Centre, Centre for Maritime Studies at the University of Turku, Aalto 
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University School of Engineering, Turku University of Applied Sciences and 
Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences. CAFE is partly funded by the 
European Union; the financing comes from the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund, the ERDF programme for Southern Finland, Priority Axis 5 
(where the Regional Council for Päijät-Häme coordinates the ERDF pro-
gramme and manages interregional thematic projects), the City of Kotka, 
Finnish Shipowners’ Association and the Kotka Maritime Research Centre 
corporate group: Aker Arctic Technology Inc., the Port of HaminaKotka, the 
Port of Helsinki, Kristina Cruises Ltd, Meriaura Ltd. and the project part-
ners. The cost estimate of the project is approximately 1.5 Million Euro and 
its duration from 1 October 2010 to 31 August 2013. 
The CAFE project consists of several Work Packages (WPs). A work pack-
age is a subset of a project that can be assigned to a specific party for execu-
tion) that are further divided into subtasks. In CAFE, the WPs are shared 
with multiple consortium members, and each subtask is led by a member. 
The work packages, subtasks and the responsible subtask leaders are: 

 WP1: Reporting of incidents and near misses in the shipping indus-
try 

 Task A: Baltic Sea Safety Discussion Forum (Kymenlaakso Uni-
versity of Applied Sciences) 

 Task B: International reporting of incidents and near misses 
(University of Turku, Centre for Maritime Studies) 

 Task C: Applicability of statistical data for risk modeling (Aalto 
University School of Engineering) 

 Task D: Benchmarking occupational safety indicators (Turku Uni-
versity of Applied Sciences) 

 WP2: Modeling safety management to increase competitive ad-
vantage in shipping 

 Task A: A conceptual model about safety management (University 
of Turku Centre for Maritime Studies) 

 Task B: Bayesian network model for estimating the effects of safe-
ty management on maritime accident risks (Aalto University 
School of Engineering) 

 WP3: Corporate social responsibility in international shipping 

 Task A: Theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and impli-
cations to the maritime sector (University of Turku Centre for 
Maritime Studies) 

 Task B: Theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and impli-
cations to the maritime sector (Kymenlaakso University of Ap-
plied Sciences) 

 WP4: International networking (all) 
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
 WP5: Coordination and management (Kotka Maritime Research 
Centre) 
This report belongs to the Task C of WP 1, “Applicability of statistical data 
for risk modeling”. 
 
1.1 Scope of the report 
The report reviews various existing information sources from the view of 
utilizing them as input data for quantitative marine traffic accident models. 
The report is based on examining the data sources, reviewing relevant liter-
ature and the results from an international expert workshop organized as a 
part of the CAFE project. 
As the report is written within the CAFE project, a special focus is paid to 
utilizing data sources when modeling human, organizational and opera-
tional factors within marine traffic. However, as accidents typically involve 
a lot of variables with complicated dependencies, the distinction between 
human and technical failure is not always clear, or it should not be. Thus 
the report also considers utilizing data for marine traffic accident models 
not focusing purely on operational safety.   
The report does not cover data that does not exist at the moment but 
could be gathered if seen feasible, such as measurements from laboratory 
experiments to be performed in the future. Other aspects of the information 
sources such as their primary purpose, the regulations concerning them 
and applications to other purposes than accident modeling, are not covered 
or they are only mentioned very briefly.  
In this report, the emphasis is on data describing the marine traffic in Fin-
land, especially in the Gulf of Finland. The reader should be aware that 
there are many similar data sources describing ship traffic and its safety 
elsewhere. However, describing all of them would be practically impossible 
and thus only a few additional sources are included either for comparison 
purposes or in cases when Finland does not maintain an appropriate data-
base for the specific problem.  The focus is on collision and grounding mod-
els, as these events have been the most common in the Gulf of Finland 
(Figure 1). Nevertheless, the data sources presented in this report could be 
utilized for other types of marine traffic accidents as well. Although the uti-
lization of accident and incident data in modeling within other domains 
may have similarities with marine traffic applications, they are not dis-
cussed in this report. 
The rest of the report is organized as follows. In order to get an overview 
to which purposes the data might be needed, some references to existing 
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accident models and their analyses are given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the feasibility of data sources describing the ship traffic, marine 
traffic accidents and near misses. In Chapter4, possible ways to improve the 
utilization of these data sources within marine traffic accident models are 
discussed. Also, a brief summary from the IMISS conference workshops is 
provided. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 5.  
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2. Marine traffic accident models 
2.1 General accident models 
Before searching for suitable data sources, one must know what kind of 
model(s) the data is needed for. The models of course depend on the nature 
of accidents one wants to analyze. This chapter briefly introduces marine 
traffic accident models, especially collision and grounding models. In order 
to keep this report compact, the existing accident models are not presented 
here in detail. Instead, for a reader interested in the models, this chapter 
gives references to the original papers or other publications summarizing 
the models. 
A theoretical description of accident causation can be described using an 
accident model. The purpose of an accident model is to serve as a compact, 
qualitative and/or quantitative representation of the mechanisms behind 
the accident. Over the years, there have been many accident models pub-
lished which are either describing the accidents on a general level or within 
a certain domain. These models are not presented here and the reader is 
advised to find summaries and references to various models e.g. in [5], [6] 
and [7]. Probabilistic collision and grounding accident models are referred 
to in the following. 
 
2.2 Collision and grounding probability and consequence 
models 
The traditional approach to estimating the probability of collisions or 
groundings models the number of accidents as a product of the so-called 
number of geometrical accident candidates and a causation probability (see 
e.g. [8]). The number of geometrical collision or grounding candidates de-
scribes the theoretical number of collisions or groundings given the ship 
traffic properties of the area, such as the historical ship tracks, speeds and 
sizes, and the assumption that the ships are not performing any evasive 
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maneuvers. For collisions, it is estimating the number of times two ships 
are on a collision course within the time period under examination. Similar-
ly, for grounding it describes the number of dangerous courses towards 
shoals. The causation probability then describes the probability that the 
ships do not make any evasive maneuvers given that they are on a collision 
or grounding course. It is thus conditional on the approach used for geo-
metrical collision candidate estimation. The causation probability is affect-
ed by various variables that are related to the mariners and the organiza-
tion, the conditions on board and outside the ship, and to technical reliabil-
ity. The existing models for accident probability estimation are not de-
scribed in this report, as various techniques and models for estimating the 
geometrical probability of collisions or groundings have already been pre-
sented and discussed in e.g. [9], [10], [11] and [12] and for the causation 
probability e.g. by the author of this report in [6] and [13].  
For estimating the damage resulting from impact accidents, there are 
many models with either analytical or numerical approach to modeling the 
problem. Some of these are discussed and compared in [14], [15] and [16]. 
Further, there are models of “the consequences of the consequences”. For 
example, the impacts of an oil spill have been modeled (e.g. [17] and [18]).  
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3. Data sources for marine traffic ac-
cident models 
3.1 Ship traffic data  
3.1.1 Traffic image data in marine traffic risk modeling 
If the marine traffic is to be modeled, some kind of information on the ship 
traffic in the analyzed area is necessary. According to Larsen [19], infor-
mation on cargo type and amount, ship velocity and navigational aids such 
as using a pilot are especially relevant to risk assessment purposes, as these 
variables affect the draft, collision energy, ship maneuverability, risk of pol-
lution, and safety. Also the environment where the ships are navigating is 
important. Thus one might need information on ship routes, traffic intensi-
ty, and the properties of the water area. Some of these variables are static 
and some dynamic; whether the variable changes over time depends on the 
risk modeling purpose: whether risk assessment is performed on a total 
ship traffic certain location or on a certain ship during its voyage, for exam-
ple.   
Especially in the past, there might have been no information on the actual 
traffic image available.  The traffic image could have been constructed 
based on various ship traffic registrations such as port registrations, pilot 
registrations, and coast guard or navy registrations. An example of a port 
registration system is described in subchapter3.1.3. Additionally, data could 
have been collected using visual or radar observations or VHF-radio com-
munications. Currently, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data can be 
utilized in modeling the traffic. Subchapter 3.1.2 discusses the AIS data and 
its feasibility.   
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Table 1. Information included in the AIS message and the update rates [20], [21] 
Type of information Information Update rate 
Static IMO and MMSI number 
Call sign and name 
Ship type 
Length and beam 
Location of position fixing antenna such as 
GPS/DGPS 
Every 6 minutes 
and on request 
Dynamic Position and accuracy indication 
Time 
Course over ground 
Speed over ground 
Heading 
Navigational status 
Rate of turn 
Angle of heel (optional) 
Pitch and roll (optional) 
2-180 seconds 
depending on 
speed and 
course alteration 
Voyage-related Draught 
Hazardous cargo type 
Destination and estimated time of arrival 
Route plan waypoints (optional) 
Number of persons onboard (on request) 
Every 6 minutes, 
when data has 
been amended 
and on request 
Short safety messaging Short text messages with important naviga-
tional safety related information 
As required 
 
3.1.2 Automatic Identification System data  
Automatic Identification System (AIS) operates on VHF frequency on and 
automatically sends and receives information between ships. The infor-
mation is also received on shore by the coastal authorities such as the Ves-
sel Traffic Service (VTS). The information transmitted via AIS can be seen 
in Table 1. The dynamic information is being updated automatically and the 
update rate depends on the speed and course alteration. Voyage-related 
information is entered manually. AIS is mandatory for all ships of 300 GT 
and upwards and to all passenger ships [22].  
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Although mainly used for safe navigation and VTS surveillance, historical 
AIS data can be used for modeling ship traffic for risk assessments. The 
trajectories and routes of the AIS-carrying ships that navigated within a 
certain water area within a certain time can be constructed, as e.g. in [23], 
[13] and [24]. The trajectories and routes can be further used in accident 
frequency estimation. AIS data has been utilized in many calculations of 
collision frequencies, especially when determining the so-called number of 
collision candidates. It has been used as input data for analytical collision 
candidate models, e.g. in [11] ,[13],[25] and [26]. Goerlandt & Kujala [12] 
used the MMSI number, time, position, speed, ship type, ship length and 
ship beam for a dynamic traffic simulation and collision candidate estima-
tion for the Gulf of Finland. AIS data was also utilized in a traffic simulation 
–based collision risk model applied to Northern American locations [27].  
In addition to reconstructing traffic patterns of detecting collision or 
grounding candidates, AIS data can be used for identifying vessels that have 
been navigating in the area. Then other data sources can be utilized in seek-
ing information on the properties of these identified vessels, e.g. their flag 
state or history of detentions (see Chapter 3.3.4).  The voyage-related in-
formation on hazardous cargo can be used in estimating the consequences 
of a possible accident. 
Unfortunately, AIS data has had many errors and its reliability can be 
questioned. Errors or missing data have been found in both the information 
inserted manually and in the dynamic variables e.g. in [20] , [28] and [29]. 
The number of AIS data points collected from a sea area depends on the 
traffic amounts, but even for a rather short time period, it typically becomes 
very high. Although the large number of data points can compensate the 
missing or erroneous data [30], it also poses some practical challenges to 
storing and using the data.  Nevertheless, AIS data still provides a very val-
uable source for modeling marine traffic and ship routes.   
 
3.1.3 Port information systems 
Over 30 ports worldwide are using either port-specific or national infor-
mation systems or the so-called port community systems (PCSs), all of 
which are used for sharing and transferring information between different 
port-related actors. In Finland, the national, Internet-based  information 
system PortNet is being used (for more information on the other systems, 
see e.g. [31]). The purpose of PortNet system is to provide a means to fulfill 
the requirements of several actors with a single notification from the ship; 
ship agents insert information on the ship calls into the system, which is 
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then being used by the customs, ports, port-related companies and mari-
time authorities [31]. PortNet contains the following information [32]:  
     Basic information 

 Ship register 

 Agents and ship owners 

 Fairway dues tables 

 Ports, port areas and berths 

 Customs offices 
Port call information 

 List of port calls 

 Port service requests 

 Port visit schedules (ETA, ATA, ETD, ATD) 

 VTS / AIS times (ETP, ATP) 
Port call notifications 

 Customs ship notification 

 Dangerous cargo 

 Cargo info, manifest 

 Cargo info, statistics 

 Waste notifications 

 IMO-FAL notifications 

 Security notification 
Ship’s dues 

 Annual fairway due 

 Tonnage due 

 Foreign traffic, single payment 

 Increase or surcharge 
Port enquiries 

 Timetables 

 Cargo information 

 Dangerous cargo reports 

 Waste notifications 

 Port service requests 

 Dangerous cargo entry permits 
Reports 

 Timetables 

 Cargo info, statistics and manifest 

 Dangerous cargo 
In Finland, PortNet has been in use for almost 10 years, and there will be 
no changes or improvements made to the system in the near future [31]. In 
addition to PortNet, there are separate own information systems for the 
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needs of various port-related parties such as port operators, customs and 
railway traffic. These are summarized in [31]. However, the information 
systems are not integrated and a PCS serving a comprehensive information 
exchange within the whole port community is not existing in Finland.  
For marine traffic accident probability modeling, a PCS might not provide 
any added value. Nevertheless, based on the PortNet system data, infor-
mation on cargoes within the Finnish waters can be derived. This is useful 
for estimating the consequences of maritime accidents, for example. Also, 
PortNet arrival and departure times can be used in checking and comple-
menting AIS data. Thus a database that would combine PortNet system 
data with AIS data and the Mandatory Ship Reporting System GOFREP and 
VTS arrival reports would form a comprehensive database describing ma-
rine traffic in Finland.  
 
3.1.4 SafeSeaNet 
SafeSeaNet is a centralized European system for maritime data exchange 
[33]. European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is responsible for the 
SafeSeaNet system and it involves authorities from EU member states plus 
Iceland and Norway. Implemented in 2004, SafeSeaNet contains infor-
mation on ship movements, the nature of hazardous cargo on board and on 
the ships considered as risky to the shipping and environment safety [34]. 
The information comes primarily from AIS messages and notifications from 
the member states. The authorities can use the information for ship traffic 
monitoring and management, search-and-rescue operations and risk man-
agement. In the future, the system will also be available for other users, 
such as customs and port state control inspections [35]. 
According to EMSA’s progress report from 2010 [34], SafeSeaNet has 
been progressing significantly, but the quality and quantity of some of its 
information still needs improvement. For the future, EMSA is developing 
Intergrated Maritime Data Environment (IMDatE), a framework that will 
combine SafeSeaNet with other marine traffic databases of EMSA, such as 
THETIS (see Subchapter 3.3.4) [36]. The purpose of IMDatE is to provide a 
complete, almost real time picture of marine traffic on an European level.   
 
3.1.5 Crews, organizations, procedures 
Modeling human and organizational factors could benefit from data which 
would describe the properties, actions and procedures of the crews and the 
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shipping company organizations. Unfortunately, information on these fac-
tors is not very well available to a risk analyst not working within a shipping 
company – the data would have to be gathered from the companies, if they 
are willing to share it. However, an ongoing research [37] will study the 
manning and crews in the Baltic Sea marine traffic. This information could 
be utilized when developing risk modeling for the Gulf of Finland, for ex-
ample.  
In Finland, The Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi keeps a seafarer 
register which contains information on the tasks and work amounts of the 
crews working onboard Finnish vessels and of a limited number of Finnish 
seafarers working on foreign ships [38]. The ship-owners are obligated by 
law to deliver this information to Trafi. Based on the register’s information, 
annual seafarer statistics are published. The statistics present the following 
information: 

 seafarer man-years, the numbers of personnel onboard and the 
numbers of people working in seafarer professions in total and in dif-
ferent occupational groups 

 the proportions of women seafarers in general and in different occu-
pation groups, domestic and international traffic 

 the proportions of foreign seafarers in general and in different occu-
pation groups 

 the proportions of age groups in general and in different occupation 
groups 
Thus, the mariner age and sex distributions within the Finnish fleet could 
be constructed from the seafarer statistics.  Unfortunately, the statistics do 
not present the nationalities of foreign seafarers, so only the proportion of 
Finns is available for utilization. 
 
3.1.6 Environment data 
Data on the environment and on location the ships are navigating and 
whose accidents are to be modeled can also be considered as ship traffic 
data. Geographic features of the water area, its currents, the weather and 
visibility might be included in the accident probability models. Also, the 
environment affects the consequences, such as the need and/or succession 
of evacuation, and the severity and the costs of a possible oil spill.  
The Finnish Transport Agency’s Hydrographic Office is responsible for 
paper and electronic charts of the coastal and lake areas of Finland. “The 
Hydrographic Office maintains a hydrographic data information service 
and publishes other material in connection with the charts” [39]. In 2003, 
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the national coordinate system KKJ is replaced by WGS 84 (EUREF_FIN) 
standard adopted by the International Hydrographic Organisation as an 
international standard. Sea area charts are published as coastal charts, har-
bor charts, chart folios and small scale charts. Electronic navigational 
charts produced by Finnish Transport Agency in S-57 vector format are 
distributed by Primar in Norway. ENC data is encrypted in accordance with 
the standard IHO S-63. All charts are commercially available. Charts are 
updated from time to time and mariners are obliged to use the valid ver-
sion. 
Finnish Transport Agency also issues Notice to Mariners where different 
kinds of navigational notices are published, Finnish List of Lights where a 
complete list of lights and information about radio navigation, pilot, VTS 
and rescue services on the Finnish coast are available. Symbols, abbrevia-
tion and terms are published, too. As a complement to the nautical charts 
and publications, fairway cards are issued. They contain facts about the 
fairway dimensions, navigability and navigational conditions, traffic rec-
ommendations and restrictions and traffic services provided. Finland has a 
total of around 19,500 kilometers of public, charted fairways marked by 
more than 33,000 maritime aids of navigation (lighthouses, buoys, signs, 
leading beacons, etc.). The Finnish Transport Agency is responsible for 
around 25,000 of these. 
In general, statistics on weather conditions have been gathered for a very 
long time. For example, Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) provides 
statistics for storm and wind days [40] and for waves and sea levels [41]. In 
Finnish waters, ice is also an environmental factor to be taken into account. 
For example, during a normal winter, the heavily trafficked Gulf of Finland 
freezes to a large extent, or even completely, and the ships need icebreaker 
assistance. The majority of ship collisions in the Gulf of Finland have oc-
curred during the dark and icy winter months [3]. Safe navigation in dy-
namic ice conditions poses many challenges to navigators, especially for 
crews not familiar with winter navigation, few examples being damages to 
hull or propulsion, grounding or collision due to avoiding ice and loss of 
stability due icing [42]. During winter, ice charts describing the ice condi-
tions in the Baltic Sea are published daily by FMI and Swedish Meteorolog-
ical and Hydrological Institute (SMHI) [43].  The ice thickness, ice type, 
and water temperature information on the charts come from satellite image 
observations, observations onboard ships and from measurements. Howev-
er, ice charts are too coarse for describing local ice conditions [44], which 
might be needed for a location-specific marine traffic risk models. For the 
Baltic Sea, a chart of ice probabilities has been published [45, cited in 44]. 
However, it also is not detailed enough for traffic risk assessment purposes. 
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3.2 Accident data 
3.2.1 DAMA database and Finnish accident statistics 
In Finland, all maritime accidents except the ones of pleasure boats must be 
reported according to the Maritime Act. Accident database DAMA consists 
of maritime casualty reports given to Finnish maritime safety authorities. 
The reported accidents of Finnish vessels and accidents to foreign vessels in 
Finnish territorial waters were stored in DAMA from the year 1990 to 2010 
[46], [47]. In 2001-2005, the average number of accident cases stored per 
year was 50. Very minor accidents such as small dents from ice assistance 
situations, pleasure boat accidents or accidents that have not been reported 
were not included in DAMA-database.  Recently, the DAMA database was 
judged as obsolete [47], and after 2010, Trafi began using EMCIP database 
(see Chapter 3.2.3) for storing the accident data.  
The categories for accident types in DAMA were: 

 Ship-ship collision 

 Collision with an offshore platform 

 Collision with a floating object 

 Collision with a bridge or quay 

 Grounding or stranding 

 Capsizing 

 Severe tilting 

 Leakage 

 Environmental damage 

 Storm damage 

 Machinery damage 

 Fire/explosion in machinery area 

 Fire/explosion in cargo area 

 Fire/explosion in other areas 

 Fire of electrical equipment 

 Injury, death, poisoning  

 Helicopter accident 

 Missing ship 

 Near accident 

 Unknown 
Besides the accident type, DAMA entries include the fields listed in Appen-
dix A. However, not all fields have been filled in all accident cases. For most 
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of the fields, the information was filled by number codes based on fixed 
categories. The causes in DAMA have been categorized under seven cause 
types: 

 External factors 

 Ship structure and layout 

 Technical faults in ship equipment 

 Factors related to equipment usage and placement 

 Cargo, cargo and fuel handling and related safety equipment 

 Communication, organizing, instructions and routines 

 Persons, situation assessment, actions 
The complete list of cause categories is presented in Appendix B.  
Based on DAMA database, accident statistics analyses have been conduct-
ed. The report covering the years 1990-2000 [48] concentrated only on 
grounding and collision incidents. The analysis for the years 2001-2005 
[46] included all the accident types. Analyses focused on accidents in Finn-
ish territorial and inland waters.  
These studies presented statistics of accident characteristics such as ship 
types, circumstances and causes. More in-depth analyses of the maritime 
accidents in Finland, such as an analysis of the correlations between the 
different factors, or studies for finding subgroups or clusters within the ac-
cidents, cannot be found. 
The advantage of accident databases such as DAMA and the HELCOM da-
tabase presented in the following subchapter is that the provided infor-
mation is categorical or numerical which enables statistical analyses. How-
ever, it is also a drawback, as the categorization has been fixed and thus it 
may create uncertainty. When considering models describing accident cau-
sation mechanisms, DAMA provides very little information. Although it is 
better to be able to store four causes of the accident than only one, the da-
tabase is lacking the description of the chains of events leading to the acci-
dent. 
 
3.2.2 Baltic Sea accident statistics 
Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission HELCOM (Helsinki 
Commission) has gathered yearly statistics of Baltic Sea accidents [49]. Ac-
cident registrations come from the coastal states of the Baltic Sea: Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rus-
sia. All accidents of tankers over 150 GT and/or other ships over 400 GT in 
states’ territorial waters or EEZs are reported. The accident reporting for-
mat changed in 2004 and thus the data before 2004 and the subsequent 
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years are not fully comparable. In 2005-2009, the average annual number 
of accidents in HELCOM database is 125. The accident dataset, from 1989 
on, can be accessed online with a map based web tool, HELCOM Map and 
data service [50]. 
The accidents in the database are divided into collisions, fire, groundings, 
machinery damages, physical damages, pollutions, sinkings, technical fail-
ures and other accidents. Collisions can be further classified as collisions 
with another vessel, with an object, or as the ones with another vessel and 
an object. The fields of the data entries can be seen in Table 2. Not all fields 
are filled for every accident case – the numbers of times the field has been 
filled and the following reporting percentages of the fields are also present-
ed in Table 2. The causes of accidents are not as specifically categorized as 
in DAMA. The cause categories in the database are “human factor”, “tech-
nical factor”, “external factor” and “other factor”. There is a text field for 
describing the cause more specifically. However, as can be seen from Table 
2, it has been filled in only 21.9% of the cases. 
HELCOM publishes annual accident statistics that present the number of 
accidents in the Baltic Sea, the spatial distributions, accident type distribu-
tions, types of vessels involved in accidents and the distributions of accident 
causes. The number of groundings and ship-ship collisions are presented 
separately for the south-western Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Finland and the 
whole Baltic Sea. Also the number of accidents with pollution, types of acci-
dents and vessels involved in them and the causes of accidents resulting in 
pollution are presented. The accident statistics reports are available online 
[51].  
In addition to the statistics published by HELCOM, a combination of 
DAMA data and HELCOM data from the years 1997-1999 and 2001-2006 
has been used in evaluating accident statistics for the Gulf of Finland [3] , 
[52]. Salmi [53] used HELCOM accident database in comparing vessels 
involved in accidents and the ones recognized as accident prone ships based 
on VTS violation and incident reports (see Chapter 3.3.3).  
HELCOM data does not contain as many accidents from Finnish waters as 
the DAMA does. As an example, in DAMA there are 46 accidents from 
Finnish waters in 2004, whereas in HELCOM database the number is 8.  
On the other hand, some of the accidents present in the HELCOM data are 
missing from DAMA. Although not complete and even containing some 
errors [53], HELCOM data is the largest database with uniform data format 
of the Baltic Sea accidents at the moment.  
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3.2.3 EMCIP database 
The European Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP) is a confi-
dential database established on EN Directive 2009/18/EC and operated by 
EMSA [54]. The main purpose of the Directive is to improve maritime safe-
ty within the EU community, and the view is that the goal can be achieved 
better by the effect of scale. Therefore, since June 2011, all Member States 
(MS) are obligatory to notify EMCIP about any maritime casualty/accident 
occurrence and provide a report for very serious and serious accidents 
which they investigate. Common training for MS personnel was provided by 
EMSA to accomplish application of the same principles in the investigations 
of casualties and data analyses across the EU. EMSA also “monitors the 
quality of and accepts the field reports” [54].  
EMCIP access is granted only to authorities entitled by MS. It is planned 
that this will include research institutes, but not businesses. Information 
about casualties involving merchant ships, recreational craft and inland 
waterway vessels are stored. Information about occupational accidents is 
also kept. All casualty events are classified according to an agreed taxonomy 
to the following event types [55]: 

 Capsizing 

 Listing 

 Collision with other ship 

 Collision with multiple ships 

 Collision, ship not underway 

 Contact with floating cargo 

 Contact with ice 

 Contact with other floating object 

 Contact with unknown floating object 

 Contact with fixed object 

 Contact with flying object 

 Damage to ship or equipment 

 Drift grounding/stranding 

 Power grounding/stranding 

 Fire 

 Explosion 

 Foundering 

 Progressive flooding 

 Massive flooding 

 Loss of electrical power 

 Loss of propulsion power 

 Loss of directional control 
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
 Loss of containment 

 Hull failure 

 Missing 
 
Collected data is divided into factual data and casualty analysis data . To 
describe the sequence of the events related to a casualty, results obtained in 
the Casualty analysis methodology for maritime operations (CASMET) 
project [56] are used. It is stated that not all accidental events necessary 
lead to casualty. Representation of the EMCIP approach, i.e., the casual 
connection between events and factors, is shown in  
Figure 2. 
The database had operated only on a voluntary basis for two years until 
June 2011 when it became obligatory. Therefore, the number of cases it 
supposedly contains might be insignificant. Once the MSs transfer previous 
experiences collected in individual databases, EMCIP will grow.  
It is still early to evaluate the quality of data in EMCIP since the database 
has been operated only for two years and on the voluntary basis only. We 
also need to wait for outcomes from the effect of scale. The results are avail-
able only to EMSA as a particular MS has access only to her own data, and 
not to the data of other MSs. Nevertheless, EMCIP manages to establish a 
common taxonomy, which can facilitate different comparison studies. We 
can discuss the “fact that virtually no taxonomy can represent the full spec-
trum of possible causes” [57], but from the research point of view having a 
common taxonomy is quite large improvement. Time will show if this theo-
retical improvement will be followed by better reports. 
Some countries such as Sweden are still using, and in the near future will 
continue to use, their own parallel accident databases. In Finland, EMCIP 
has replaced DAMA. When an accident occurs in Finnish waters or to a 
Finnish ship, a report has to be filled, signed and sent to Trafi. The report is 
in a paper format and has 15 pages. First three contain a general part and 
are obligatory. The rest of the pages cover different categories of accidents 
and need to be fulfilled depending on the event occurred. There are eight 
categories and an additional called “other accidents/incidents”. Trafi gets 
on average 30 reports per year, but not all of them are investigated. Finnish 
Accident Investigation Board has access to data stored in EMCIP and based 
on those data decide which accident needs to be further investigated.  As 
already mentioned, research institutes will have access to the database, but 
this is still not the case. 
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Figure 2. EMCIP approach 
 
In a report of the marine traffic accident statistics for the year 2010 [58], 
merchant fleet and pleasure boat accidents within 2007-2010 were exam-
ined. Trafi provided data for 2007-2008 from the DAMA database and for 
the years 2009-2010 from EMCIP. Other data sources for the report were 
marine traffic accidents from the Finnish police forces database, search and 
rescue (SAR) task database of the Finnish Border Guard, and the SAR tasks 
of voluntary maritime rescue associations in Finland provided by the Finn-
ish Lifeboat Institution. The accidents with casualties were checked and 
completed by Statistics Finland. The publication presented the numbers of 
marine traffic accidents and the numbers of casualties for various factors 
such as water areas, age, sex, month, weekday and time. Also, distributions 
of ship types (four merchant vessel and nine pleasure boat types) and caus-
es (nine cause types) in the accidents were reported.  
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Table 2. Data fields in HELCOM accident database. The number of times reported de-
scribes the number of cases where the corresponding field has not been left blank or report-
ed as “n.i.”, “unknown” etc. Percentages marked with *  are calculated from the number of 
collisions with another vessel, the one with ** from the number of collisions, and the one 
with *** from the number of accidents with pollution. Ship2 size (dwt) values were found to 
be identical to the reported Ship1 size (dwt) in all but one collision with another vessel, so its 
correctness can be questioned and the reporting percentage is not presented in the table. 
Data field Entry format 
# of 
times 
reported 
Reporting  
% 
Date dd.mm.yyyy 1251 100,0 % 
Ship1 name text 1251 100,0 % 
Ship2 name text 145 100,0 % * 
Year numeric 1251 100,0 % 
Latitude numeric 1250 99,9 % 
Longitude numeric 1250 99,9 % 
Accident type categorical (see text) 1249 99,8 % 
Ship1 category cargo/passenger/tanker/other/n.i. 1230 98,3 % 
Pollution no/yes/n.i. 1166 93,2 % 
Type of pollution text 133 93,0 % *** 
Amount of pollution (m3) numeric 1021 81,6 % 
Collision type object/vessel/vessel&object/n.i. 273 78,0 % ** 
Ship1 type text 964 77,1 % 
Ship2 category cargo/passenger/tanker/other/n.i. 108 75,0 % * 
Ship2 type text 87 65,9 % * 
Country text 756 60,4 % 
Ship1 size (gt) numeric 725 58,0 % 
Time hh.mm 646 51,6 % 
Ship2 size (gt) numeric 68 51,5 % * 
Cause, ship1 human/technical/external/other/n.i. 616 49,2 % 
Ship1 draught (m) numeric or interval 590 47,2 % 
Pilot, ship1 no/yes/exemption certificate/n.i. 572 45,7 % 
Cargo type text 535 42,8 % 
Ice conditions no/yes/n.i. 507 40,5 % 
Damage text 478 38,2 % 
Cause, ship2 human/technical/external/other/n.i. 46 34,8 % 
Accident details text 423 33,8 % 
Ship1 size (dwt) numeric 395 31,6 % 
Offence text 277 22,1 % 
Cause details text 274 21,9 % 
Assistance need text 209 16,7 % 
Ship1 hull single/double/n.i. 170 13,6 % 
Pilot, ship2 no/yes/exemption certificate/n.i. 15 11,4 % * 
Ship2 hull single/double/n.i. 13 9,8 % * 
Ship2 draught (m) numeric or interval 55 4,4 % * 
Additional info text 38 3,0 % 
Consequences/Response actions text 36 2,9 % 
Amount of pollution (tons) numeric 15 1,2 % 
Crew trained in ice navigation no/yes/n.i. 14 1,1 % 
Ship2 size (dwt) numeric 157 -  
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3.2.4 Accident investigations 
IMO has established a Casualty Investigation Code, which “will require a 
maritime safety investigation to be conducted into every ‘very serious mari-
time casualty’, defined as a maritime casualty involving the total loss of the 
ship or a death or severe damage to the environment. The Code will also 
recommend an investigation into other maritime casualties and incidents, 
by the flag State of a ship involved, if it is considered likely that it would 
provide information that could be used to prevent future accidents.” [59]. 
In Finland, the Accident Investigation Board, located within the Ministry 
of Justice, investigates and reports “all major accidents regardless of their 
nature as well as all aviation, marine and rail accidents and their incidents” 
[60]. Marine accidents are investigated if they have occurred within Finnish 
waters, or if a Finnish vessel has been involved in the accident. The Board 
investigates and reports how the accident occurred, what were the circum-
stances, the causes, the consequences and the rescue operations. The re-
ports based on the investigations also provide recommendations of actions 
for preventing similar accidents. The purpose of the marine accident inves-
tigation process is to prevent the accidents – not to blame or judge anyone. 
The marine traffic accident investigation reports of accidents from 1997 on 
and 10 older reports are available at Accident Investigation Board’s web 
pages [61]. On 20 May 2011, 162 reports of accidents, serious incidents, 
incidents, damages, minor accidents and other incidents could be down-
loaded from the page.   
For comparison purposes, Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
is examined as one of the most representative investigation bodies world-
wide. The aim of MAIB is to investigate marine accidents/incidents oc-
curred within UK territorial water or involving UK vessels worldwide. It is 
an independent unit within the Department for Transport which was 
formed in 1989. MAIB operates under a legislative framework provided in 
The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 
2005, amended in 2011 to bring into force EU Directive 2009/18/EC [62]. 
MAIB maintains a computerized database of reportable marine accidents 
which have occurred since 1991. The reports from 1973 to 1988 were pro-
duced by the Marine Division of the Department of Trade. The existing re-
porting scheme was changed in October 2001 when MAIB’s new database 
became fully operational. An entirely new taxonomy or classification of ma-
rine accidents was devised by the MAIB inspectors. In the transition phase 
from the old system to the new, 21000 separate records of accidents report-
ed to the Branch over a period of ten years were transferred electronically 
[63]. It can be assumed that this figure has doubled since that period. Dur-
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ing this process, the data was cleaned in order to correct any inconsisten-
cies. These changes have resulted in minor variations to historic data [63]. 
Due to the unavailability of the database, the aforementioned variations 
cannot be validated. However, information from the database is available 
through ‘Freedom of Information’ Act [64]. Service is provided on the De-
partment for Transport’s web pages. Individuals have a right to request any 
recorded information held by a public authority [65]. Still, the information 
may not be given because it is exempt, for example if it reveals personal 
details about somebody else (different than the person who was asking for 
the information) [65]. It is unlikely that the whole database information can 
be asked, but an example of a request included ‘near miss and incidents 
related to LNG tankers’ (2011). A list of sixteen cases occurred in 1991 and 
after were given as an answer for the aforementioned request. In 2011, 
there were 17 requests for information connected with shipping. Not all of 
those were related to accident investigations. In 2009, one of MAIB’s objec-
tives was to “develop a new database that will replace the existing Marine 
Incident Database System with a system that will reflect modern accident 
investigation processes and fulfill the UK’s data provision obligations to 
EMSA and IMO” [62]. In 2011, this is still uncompleted.  
MAIB receives between 1500 and 2000 reports of accidents and incidents 
each year [62]. Not all of them are investigated and effort was made to se-
lect “which incidents are likely to yield the most important issues for future 
safety. It is only these accidents that MAIB investigates” [66]. In 2001, the 
maximum number of reports published as results from fully conducted in-
vestigations was 45. In 1999, a decision was made to make all reports pub-
licly available. From June 2011 on, as to comply with the EU Directive, the 
MAIB (and all Member States) must conduct a full investigation into all 
‘very serious accidents’, and give reasons for any ‘serious accident’ which 
they do not intend to fully investigate.  
MAIB investigation reports are sorted by year (from 1990 to 2011, date of 
year published), vessel category (merchant vessel, fishing vessel, leisure 
craft), incident (machinery, fire/explosions, injury/fatality, grounding, col-
lision/contact, flooding/foundering, listing/capsize, cargo handling failure, 
weather damage, hull defects, hazardous incidents) or alphabetically.  
Shorter narrative information about accidents other than those investi-
gated in the reports is also available online. These are given in Safety Di-
gests, approximately 25 cases, twice per year.  
Accident investigation reports were used in the study of performance 
shaping factors in navigation accidents in the Royal Norwegian Navy [67]. 
For evaluating the presence of patterns in the accidents, cluster analysis 
was performed to the data. Accident reports were also used when the role of 
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human and organizational error was analyzed in Washington State Ferries 
risk assessment [68] and in an investigation process where marine traffic 
accident reports published by authorities of several countries were used for 
estimating occurrence probabilities and consequences of human [69]. 
Kiuru and Salmi [70] studied 92 marine accident investigation reports from 
Finland in order to find the impact of International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code on accident risk.  
Many researchers have used and analyzed the data obtained from MAIB’s 
investigations reports. Some studies used a specific case as an example 
while others provided summaries of historical accident cases. Fishing vessel 
accident studies can be found in [71] and [72]. Accidents occurring during 
transportations of packaged dangerous goods were investigated in [73]. 
Causal factors in the accidents of high-speed crafts are analyzed in [74] and 
[75] presents a human factors related study with some references to other 
articles with the similar topic.  
According to Reason [76], the reliability of accident reports can be ques-
tioned, since they will always have a simplified presentation of the events 
and are mostly concerned with attributing blame. Accidents with no inju-
ries are underreported, more severe accidents are investigated in more de-
tail and a high risk of bias might be present when using accident investiga-
tion reports as data [67]. 
Accident reports are in text format and their usage typically requires hu-
man effort in extracting information from the text. The task can become 
tedious while humans may not always be capable of extracting the infor-
mation objectively. The challenges have been attempted to tackle with text 
mining. Text mining is the process of automatically analyzing the contents 
of text documents for finding interesting features or patterns [77]. As an 
example, the role of lack of situation awareness in maritime accident causa-
tion was examined using a text mining software from accident reports [78].  
The results from text mining were comparable to the manual analysis of the 
reports. 
 
3.3 Incident and near miss data 
3.3.1 The need and nature of incident and near miss data 
Harrald et al. [79] stated that the collected marine accident data is not de-
tailed enough for a human error assessment and suspected that it unlikely 
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will ever be. Therefore they emphasized the need for data from ‘near miss’ 
situations for more advanced modeling and risk assessment.  
Incident or near miss data can be collected by the shipping companies 
themselves or by flag state or port state authorities. Depending on the type 
of data, it may have been collected from voluntary or obligatory reporting. 
The following subchapters present a couple of types of near miss data from 
shipping companies and authorities.  
 
3.3.2 Insjö/ForeSea 
ForeSea is an anonymous and voluntary experience data bank initiated by 
Finnish and Swedish organizations and government agencies to improve 
maritime safety. The aim of the database is “to capture the conditions that 
are normally not reported to authorities” [80]. These include accidents, 
near misses and non-conformities. The database is a refined version of the 
Swedish information system Insjö which was launched in 2002. Two sys-
tems are currently running in parallel, but the plan is to replace Insjö with 
ForeSea. 
Twelve companies are reporting to ForeSea, comparing with 76 members 
of Insjö [81]. The same data held in company’s Safety Management System 
(SMS) are transferred to Insjö. This can be done automatically if the com-
pany has an IRIS (Incident Report Information System). So far 11 compa-
nies have it. An alternative method of contributing to the database is a re-
port sent by the Designated Person (DP). Only the DP has login rights and 
is entitled to report to the experience bank. This is to ensure the credibility 
of data. After the report is received, edited and verified, information on the 
source is destroyed to protect anonymity. The database is administered by a 
third party.  
DP forwards information obtained from one of the company’s ships. This 
report is written in narrative form and should answer the questions what 
and where happened, and what were the causes and consequences of the 
event. The report is short and its quality depends on the reporter’s skills. 
After receiving the report, Insjö/ForeSea administrator still has a possibil-
ity to contact the DP for additional information. The report is stored after 
being disidentified and connected with keywords to facilitate searching. In 
the future, ForeSea will also have a possibility of supplementing a field 
where more information (e.g. pictures) can be added. The database admin-
istrator is responsible for classifying the event (near miss) into 27 catego-
ries. Classification is done based on his interpretation of the event. Accord-
ing to [82], the task has not been perceived as difficult due to the fact that 
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reports are short and the call-back function is on administrator’s disposal. 
For each report, the administrator sends feedback information to the DP. 
These are in form of similar cases; up to ten cases is found reasonable to 
send [82].  
The philosophy behind the taxonomy is “what can be got into”, compared 
with EMCIP’s philosophy of “what a collector wants to get in” [82]. Data 
can be separated into five main categories: prerequisite data, the course of 
events, the causes, the consequences, and the measures. Each of these is 
further divided into subcategories, for example the causes are divided into 
human/manning, working environment, marine environment, technical 
ship and cargo and management causes. This is presented in Table 1. The 
taxonomy enables analysis with Ishikawa diagram [83] for all data and for a 
specific report. An example of such a diagram from ForeSea can be found in 
Figure 3. When the database was accessed (without a login), for some rea-
son it was not possible to see the diagram for all accident reports, while for 
all near accidents there were no problems. 
Approximately one report per year per ship is obtained in Insjö. The goal 
is to have ten reports per vessel per year [82]. On the 7th of December 2011, 
Insjö experience data bank contained 1282 accident reports, 841 near miss-
es and 532 non conformity records, in total 2655 cases. 1268 reports are 
transferred into ForeSea. All reports in ForeSea are written in English. 
There are less than ten active companies which contribute to Insjö [82]. 
Other companies are more interested to browse the cases than to contribute 
with their own reports. The most active companies are the ones with IRIS 
system (when the report is sent automatically), or the ones for which re-
porting is market driven such as tanker operators. To enlarge the database 
and secure the anonymity, the plan is to include other countries besides 
Sweden and Finland into the system. 
After ForeSea becomes fully operational in July 2013,  every individual 
member company will be required to provide reports to the database every 
year. The reason behind the requirement is to “ensure that experience data 
bank will grow and that no shipping company uses experience of others 
without providing his own” [80]. 
Data stored in the Insjö database is available to four categories of users: 
public, visitors, designated persons and researchers. They all have different 
rights and not all features are available to all users. While public has the 
most limited entrée, covering only recent reports and key figures (not able 
to login), researchers have access to the most features, including also a right 
to export data to Excel format. Access to researchers has to be granted by 
ship owners, it is connected with a specific project and it is time limited. 
Only the administrator has a full access. 
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Studies on Insjö database can be found in [84] and [85]. More recent 
studies on near-miss reporting practices in Finland and Sweden are pre-
sented in [86] and [87].  
 
 
Table 3. Data separation scheme of the Insjö database 
PREREQUISITIES 
      
Human/manning Technical   
Report ID 
Not reported Not reported   
Crew composition Inspection/Test/Approval   
Regdate Criminal action Installation   
Type of event 
Culture/Language Maintenance   
Education/Training Passenger   
Activity of the ship Familiarization Quality of materials   
Activity on board, type of work Individual diminished ability 
Reliability/Lack of 
equipment   
Location Individual motivation Repair   
 Individual mental action Ship/Equipment design   
 Qualification/Competence Stewing/Packing/Lashing   
COURSE OF EVENT 
Mental stress Technical documentation   
Other Other   
Event heading       
Mechanism 
Working environment Marine environment   
Not reported Not reported   
Contact Living conditions Ice conditions   
 Occupational health and safety 
standard Navigational conditions   
Personal protective equipment Pilot assistance   
Protection device/Safe guards 
Yard, port and tug assis-
tance   
Professional leadership and 
teamwork SAR operations   
Safety training standard 
Traffic/Navigational 
information   
Workplace design/Ergonomics 
Traffic situation and 
other ships   
CAUSES 
Working conditions Visibility   
Other Water/Sea state   
Human/manning 
  Warfare/Piracy   
Management Wind force   
Working environment Not reported Other   
Marine environment Bridge and control room proce-dures     
Technical ship and cargo Communication and information     
Management  
Contigency planning     
Emergency response     
  Familiarization     
  Leadership and teamwork     
CONSEQUENCES 
Reporting and corrective actions     
Responsibility/Supervision     
Individual ISM instructions and manuals     
Environment 
Training     
Work organization     
Ship Work planning     
Third party 
Other     
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Taking into account that the similar causes govern accidents and near 
misses, it should be possible to use near-miss data for accident modeling. 
Insjö and ForeSea contain only a short description of the event in narrative 
form, with very little factual data available (the ship type, type of event, the 
activity of the ship, the location). Hence, traffic models cannot benefit from 
these two databases. Utilization might be possible in accident models, but 
as with accident investigation reports, one should go through all reports 
and extract information manually.  
Even though a shipping company would not report to Insjö or Foresea 
databank, the ISM code still requires a near miss reporting from all SOLAS 
ships and thus these ships should have collected near miss data anyway. It 
can be assumed that the content and quality of the internal reports is the 
same as of the ones reported to the near miss databases. The number of 
reports can be larger, though. The reports are used as learning opportuni-
ties on case by case basis. However, data is not yet utilized for establishing 
trends [87]. Consequently, it can be assumed that any accident models have 
not been built either. 
 
3.3.3 Vessel Traffic Service data  
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) provides information and navigational guid-
ance to the vessels navigating in a VTS monitoring area. In Finland, VTS is 
operated by the Finnish Transport Agency and the information is given in 
Finnish, Swedish or English [88]. In addition, the VTS centers can organize 
the traffic in the area. The information the VTS provides, such as waterway 
conditions, icebreaker assistance and other traffic in the area, can be given 
when the ship reports her arrival to the VTS area, when necessary, or when 
requested by the ship. The navigational guidance can be given to an identi-
fied vessel by request or if the VTS center finds it necessary given the cir-
cumstances. However, the guidance is only advisory and the master of a 
ship remains responsible for the maneuvering. The aim of the traffic organ-
ization is to avoid dangerous encounters and traffic jams. 
In Finnish territorial waters, vessels with a GT of at least 300 are obliged 
by law to participate in the VTS monitoring [89]. Participating means re-
porting their arrival to the VTS area and active listening to the VHF channel 
of the VTS monitoring. The vessels not obliged to participate in the VTS 
monitoring are also recommended to listen to the channel. In Finland, all 
VHF traffic and traffic image data from the VTS centers is recorded. The 
recordings must be stored for 30 days. 
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Figure 3. An example of Ichikawa diagram of the  ForeSea database describing the near 
accidents in the database. 
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Table 4. Information fields of the Finnish VTS violation and incident reports from the year 
2009. In addition, a capture of the situation on ECDIS is attached to the report which may 
include additional AIS information about the vessel’s speed, course and heading. The filling 
percentages are calculated from 21 VTS incident forms and 37 violation forms from the first 
six months of 2009. 
 Violation report Incident report 
Type of infor-
mation Field 
Type of field 
and filling % Field 
Type of field 
and filling % 
Vessel identifica-
tion 
Name 
Flag 
Port of registry 
Callsign 
Type 
IMO Number 
MMSI 
GT 
Text (100 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (65 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (76 %) 
Name 
Call sign 
IMO Number 
Pilot 
Master 
Text  (95 % ) 
Text (90 %) 
Text (76 %) 
Text (38 %) 
Text (0 %) 
 
Time Date and time Text (92 % ) Date and time Text (100 %) 
Position, speed and 
course 
Latitude & longitude 
 
Text (100 %) 
 
Position 
Destination 
Text (86 % ) 
Text (81 %) 
Location Territorial waters of 
Finland / international 
waters 
 
Outside scheme / 
Traffic Separation 
Scheme / 
Lane / 
 
Separation zone / 
Other location 
Check box (100 
%) 
 
 
 
Check box 
Check box / Text 
(name) 
Check box / Text 
(desc.) 
Check box 
Check box / Text 
(desc.) 
(76 %) 
Hanko VTS 
Helsinki VTS 
Kotka VTS 
GOFREP 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
(95 %) 
Identification Plotted by Radar / 
Plotted by AIS 
Identified by 
 
Check box (89 
%) 
 
Text (GOFREP 
or VTS) (0 %) 
- - 
Weather Wind direction 
Wind force (m/s) 
Sea state (douglas) 
Visibility (m) 
Text (68 %) 
Text (68 %) 
Text (22 %) 
Text (8 %) 
Weather Text (visib. 67 %, 
wid dir. 95 %, wind 
force 95 %) 
Type of non-
conformity 
- - Near miss 
Accident 
AIS 
Environment 
Pilot 
Equipment 
Personal injuries 
Emergency 
Other 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
 
Check box 
Check box 
(100 % ) 
Contravened regu-
lations 
Rule 10 (b) i 
Rule 10 (b) ii 
Rule 10 (b) iii, joining 
Rule 10 (b) iii, leaving 
Rule 10 (c) 
Rule 10 (d) 
Rule 10 (e) 
Rule 10 (f)  
Rule 10 (g) 
Rule 10 (h) 
Rule 10 (i) 
Rule 10 (j)  
IMO Resolution 
MSC.139(76) Annex 1 
Other rules 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
Check box 
 
Check box / Text 
(95 %) 
  
Addiditional infor-
mation 
Details of the incident Text (97 %) Description of 
incident 
Actions taken by 
VTS Operator 
Operator 
Supervisor 
Text 
 
Text (Descr. and/or 
actions 100 %) 
Text (100 %) 
Text (95 %) 
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In the Gulf of Finland, Mandatory Ship Reporting System GOFREP area 
covers the international waters and Finnish and Estonian territorial water 
areas not included in their VTS areas. Helsinki VTS, Tallinn VTS and St. 
Petersburg VTS centers monitor the GOFREP area and provide guidance to 
the vessels. Ships over 300 GT must report their arrival to the area or when 
they are leaving a port in the Gulf.  Smaller vessels must report if they have 
some problems with the maneuvering ability, for example [90]. 
In Finland, VTS operators should report all violations they observe within 
the Finnish VTS areas and the GOFREP area. Also, incidents or near misses 
within Finnish waters are reported. The violations of regulations are re-
ported to the maritime authorities and to the flag states. However, differ-
ences in the numbers of reported violations between VTS operators have 
been detected [S. Talja (Finnish Transport Agency/Gulf of Finland Vessel 
Traffic Centre), personal communication, 7th of October, 2011]. In 2010, a 
total number of 125 incident and violation reports were made at the Gulf of 
Finland VTS center.  
The format of the violation and especially the incident reporting forms has 
slightly varied over the years but the basic structure, a narrative text field 
for describing the event and a few check box –type options for the location 
or circumstances, has remained unchanged. The information the reports 
covered in the first half of the year 2009 and the fill-up percentages is pre-
sented in Table 4. In addition to the filled form, a capture (or captures) of 
the situation on a sea chart is typically attached to the report. These cap-
tures may include additional information from the AIS such as the vessel’s 
course, heading and speed. At the beginning of 2012, the reporting system 
will be reformed. All reporting will then be done into an electrical system. 
At the moment of writing this (October 2011), information about the details 
of the system or the contents of the reporting forms was not yet available.  
Based on two two-week periods of Archipelago VTS, West Coast VTS and 
Gulf of Finland Vessel Traffic Centre operators reporting all the situations 
requiring VTS intervention, the work of the VTS was described both verbal-
ly and statistically [91]. Salmi [53] used violation reports for identifying 
accident-prone vessels by comparing the vessels present at the violation 
reports between 2004-2008 to HELCOM accident statistics. In the study it 
was found that for 2007 accidents, 15 % of the reported accidents had oc-
curred to a vessel identified by the VTS reporting beforehand. 
VTS violation and incident reports can be used in identifying risk-prone 
vessels for risk modeling purposes. The categorized data in the reports does 
not provide much input to the risk models. Weather, rule 10, The VTS inci-
dent and violation reports provide information on the situation itself. In 
order to use VTS violation or incident reports in quantitative risk modeling, 
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the information about the situation, the vessel(s) and the circumstances 
must be transformed into categorical data, which, as already stated for ac-
cident databases in Chapter 3.2.1, may introduce some uncertainty. On the 
other hand, as with accident investigation reports, finding the truth behind 
the textual information may also be challenging.  Nevertheless, the ad-
vantage of VTS violation and incident reports is that violations and inci-
dents occur more frequently than accidents and thus there is more data to 
be utilized. 
3.3.4 Port State Control inspection data 
Port State Control (PSC) is the inspection of the condition, equipment, 
manning and operation of foreign state vessels conducted by the port state 
authority when the foreign ships are visiting a port in the port state [92]. 
The purpose of the PSC inspections is to verify that the aforementioned 
aspects on board comply with the international regulations.  Finland is a 
member of Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU),which is an 
agreement on a  harmonized system on Port State Control covering Euro-
pean coastal states and the west coast of Canada [93]. Similar MoUs cover 
all oceans in the World.  
Since the beginning of 2011, the priority, frequency and scope of the Paris 
MoU inspections are determined with Ship Risk Profile. Ship Risk Profile 
classifies ships into High risk ships, Standard risk ships and Low risk ships. 
It is determined based on various factors such as ship type, age, flag, com-
pany performance and the number of deficiencies recorded in the previous 
inspections. The details of determining the Ship Risk Profile can be found 
in the Paris Mou text [94]. As some of the factors behind the Ship risk pro-
file are dynamic, it is updated daily. Ships are inspected periodically with an 
inspection interval depending on the ship risk profile: 5-6 months after the 
last inspection in the Paris MoU region for a high risk ship, 10-12 months 
for a standard risk ship and 24-36 months for a low risk ship. In case of 
presence of overriding or unexpected factors listed in the Paris MoU text, 
and additional inspection must (overriding factor) or may (unexpected fac-
tor) be carried out before reaching the end of the inspection interval. Before 
the Ship Risk Profile was established, the inspected ships were chosen very 
similarly (e.g. as in [95]). 
Paris MoU inspections can be divided into four categories [96]. An initial 
inspection visit consists of checking certificates and documents listed in 
Paris MoU text [94], performing an overall condition and hygiene check of 
the ship and verifying that any possible deficiencies found in the previous 
inspections have been corrected as were required. If during an initial in-
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spection there are clear grounds to believe the ship may have some defi-
ciencies, a more detailed inspection is carried out. These clear grounds are 
mentioned in the Paris MoU text. A more detailed inspection will cover the 
area where the clear grounds were established or that are relevant to over-
riding or unexpected factors and areas chosen randomly from the following 
list [94]: 
1. Documentation 
2. Structural condition 
3. Water/weathertight condition 
4. Emergency systems 
5. Radio communication 
6. Cargo operations 
7. Fire safety 
8. Alarms 
9. Living and working condition 
10. Navigation equipment 
11. Lifesaving appliances 
12. Dangerous goods 
13. Propulsion and auxiliary machinery 
14. Pollution prevention 
An expanded inspection will cover all the categories mentioned above. The 
fourth inspection category is a concentrated inspection campaign. It has a 
certain focus area and runs for a limited time, during which all PSC inspec-
tions will additionally address the details of this area. As an example, a 
three-month campaign on structural safety and load lines was launched in 
September 2011 [96]. 
The results from the PSC inspections are gathered to a database that is ac-
cessible by public on Paris MoU web site [97]. ParisMoU inspections are 
also available through a European PSC database THETIS [98]. 
The web interface provides a possibility to search the inspections of a cer-
tain vessel identified by IMO Number and/or Name. It can also be used 
when searching multiple vessels based on their flag, ship type, size, age, 
classification society, the date period of inspection, port state, type of in-
spection, inspection port, the number of deficiencies and/or duration of 
detention. The search results in information on the factors listed in Table 5. 
As an example, when writing this report, a search of all ships under Finnish 
flag resulted in a list of 792 inspections, and a search of inspections con-
ducted by Finland as the port state resulted in 1596 inspections, inspected 
between 29 October 2007 and 24 October 2011. 
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Table 5. The information the Paris MoU inspection database search provides on an PSC 
inspection of a vessel 
Information type Details 
Ship details 
IMO Number 
Type 
Name  
GT 
Flag  
Keel Laying Date 
ISM Company 
IMO Number 
Name 
Address 
City 
Country 
List of charterers (if any) 
 
Type    
Name    
Address    
City    
Country 
List of Class Certificates 
issuing authority  
issue date  
expiry date  
List of the Statutory Certificates 
 
Certificate    
Issuing authority    
issue date    
expiry date  
Surveying authority    
Date of last survey    
Place of last survey  
A list of the ports in route  
Inspection Details 
Type of Inspection 
Place of Inspection 
Date of first visit 
Data of final visit 
Nb. of Deficiencies 
Nb. of Deficiencies ground for detention 
List of the inspected areas 
 
 
List of the operational Controls Carried Out 
 
 
A list of the deficiencies 
 
Area    
Defective item    
Nature of defect    
Ground for detention    
RO Related  
 
Figure 4. A Bayesian network model of ship accidents proposed by Li et al. [101]. Port State 
Control data, accident data and ship fleet data were used for the model parameters 
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Port State Control data has been used in many previous studies. In a data 
analysis of 42  000  Indian MoU inspections [99], types of deficiencies 
found during inspections and the changes in these deficiencies over time 
and between successive inspections were examined. Knapp and Frances 
[100] studied the effect of PSC inspections on the probability of accidents 
and incidents using a binary logistic regression model. Their data consisted 
of more than 180 000 PSC inspections for approximately 26 000 ships, 
over 11 000 casualty records from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, Lloyd’s Mari-
time Intelligence Unit and the IMO, and, from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, 
information on  almost 44 000 ships for inspections.  Li et al. [101] also 
used PSC inspections, accident data and static ship data in their model. 
From the data, they constructed the probability parameters of a Bayesian 
network model for shipping accidents. The structure of their model, which 
was based on expert assumptions and accident data, can be seen in Figure 
4.  
The information the PSC inspection database contains is easily usable in 
quantitative risk modeling as the information is in categorical format. 
However, PSC data alone only provides information on the deficiencies and 
inspection history of a vessel. Also, it should be kept in mind that PSC in-
spection data is not describing the ship fleet on average but the vessels cho-
sen to be inspected.  
3.3.5 Occupational safety data 
Within the maritime domain, insurance companies and authorities collect 
occupational safety data [102]. According to interviews within Finnish 
shipping companies [102], the levels of occupational safety and general 
maritime safety are not independent. Thus occupational safety data might 
bring some additional information for marine traffic accident models as 
well. With the hypothesis that an indicator for occupational safety, such as 
the number of occupational safety incidents or the lost time incident (LTI) 
frequency, and the number of marine traffic accidents, such as the number 
of collisions, are dependent, one could use the occupational safety data for 
identifying the accident-prone ships. In a model describing the human and 
organizational factors, an indicator of occupational safety such as LTI fre-
quency could be seen dependent on a company’s level of safety culture. It 
would thus provide indirect information on the hidden safety culture varia-
ble, which can be hard to measure and model as such. Models with hidden 
variables are discussed more in Chapter 4.3.    
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3.4 Insurance company data 
Hull&Machinery (H&M) and Protection&Indemnity (P&I) are two of the 
best known ship insurances. The former is more related to technical dam-
ages to the ship, while the P&I insurance is connected with the operation of 
the vessel and covers claims related to crew, cargo and liabilities for pollu-
tion and wreck removal. There are two categories which can be covered 
either by H&M or P&I insurance and these are [103]: 
1. Collisions – damage sustained to the ship and sometimes also liabil-
ity towards the other ship 
2. Striking other objects – damage inflicted on the own ship and some-
times also liability towards the owners of the other object 
As the interest is mainly for data which can help in modeling human and 
organizational factors, P&I insurance is found more suitable to study.  
In Finland, Alandia Marine provides insurance services. Company oper-
ates in the Baltic Sea area and had 1847 insured vessels on 31 December 
2010, of which more than 100 are Finnish flagged ships [104]. Alandia of-
fers the service of H&M, but P&I insurance is “developed only for smaller 
tonnage (not exceeding 2,000 GT) in limited trade”. On their web pages [ref 
to the web page], links are given to two P&I Clubs, namely Gard (Norway) 
and UK (United Kingdom). We are focusing on the latter. UK P&I Club 
handles 7000 claims a year [105].  
Even though the UK P&I Club is aware that “human error dominates the 
underlying causes of major claims”, the Club “does not record the root 
causes of the human error which played a part in the incident” [106]. Statis-
tical data on issues such as fatigue, lack of training, inadequate manage-
ment or the myriad of mental, motivational or emotional causes of human 
error are not collected, as they have been found to be unnecessary in set-
tling liability claims. They have promised to study and publish report about 
the root causes of human errors. This was stated in 1997. Data will be clas-
sified using taxonomy from the US Coast Guard. Despite the fact that the 
Club “has for some years sought a methodology for both defining and ana-
lyzing human error in the maritime context” [105], no report on root causes 
has been published so far.  
P&I Clubs conduct regular inspections and surveys on ships owned by 
their clients [107]. Vessels are chosen randomly and, by the end of 1994, 
2000 ships had been visited.  At present, there are more than 600 ship vis-
its every year. Inspection visits “should supplement the owner’s own man-
agement system” [107]. A visit lasts approximately four hours and it is done 
by P&I Club’s own inspectors. The purpose is to see whether international 
and classification society’s requirements are met regarding cargoworthi-
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ness, manning, general maintenance, safety including safety working prac-
tices, operational status and pollution. The inspectors have a guide note-
book containing relevant questions [107]. No information is available on 
how the answers to these questions are stored or if they are stored at all. 
Interestingly, two forms contain information relevant to human factors 
modeling. Officer qualifications are recorded in those, as well as infor-
mation about manning and management, language and pilotage. If the in-
spector makes a comment, it will be recorded. Inspectors are also armed 
with a digital camera and any information obtained in this manner is at-
tached to the report.  
P&I Clubs also carry conditional surveys whose main purpose is to agree 
on the damage cause, nature and extent [108] . These are done by inde-
pendent consultants. The process applied at Swedish Club is explained 
here. According to Swedish Club web pages [108], “Before attending a casu-
alty, the surveyor will search the Club’s own computerized records for any 
claims associated with the vessel that have not been finally settled. The sur-
veyor will include details on the status of such casualties in the report, if 
relevant”. The report forms are available online  [109]. Vessel particulars, 
crew matrix information, circumstances of the survey and some answers to 
the survey questionnaire could be used in modeling human and organiza-
tional factors. The following documentation is available to a surveyor [108]: 

 Vessel log books, covering relevant period 

 A signed statement from the Master, Chief Engineer and/or ship’s 
personnel directly involved 

 Vessel’s ISM damage/non conformity report 

 Maintenance records 

 Classification records 

 A repair specification, if available 

 A statement outlining the cause of the damage, in the owner’s opin-
ion, and any documentation supporting the owner’s statement 

 Drawings 
In addition to inspections and surveys, P&I Clubs also provide their mem-
bers with Pre Engagement Medical Examination (PEME) program, where 
“accredited clinics are held accountable to both the Club and Members for 
their performance” [110]. It is unclear whether this also means that Clubs 
possess medical data obtained during examination. 
It can be concluded that insurance companies have a large amount of data 
potentially usable for risk modeling, but these are not available to public or 
researchers. Hence the structure of the database, the quantity or the quality 
of the data cannot be checked. 
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3.5 Classification societies 
Classification societies have a large role when it comes to the safety of a 
ship as a system. If suspected that ship safety might be endangered, Class 
can intervene during design and construction phases, as well as during sur-
veys. Insight into different data is on their disposal, starting from drawings, 
material deficiencies, maintenance actions, etc. The collected data is mainly 
related to technology and might be used in a reliability assessment or for 
maintenance studies. Classification societies use accident data to revise the 
Rules. Information about hull characteristics can be used for modeling the 
consequences in case of a grounding or a collision. 
 Except for accident reports (see for example DNV web pages [111]), the 
majority of the data which the classification societies collect is confidential. 
Nevertheless, some societies offer other services, too. For example, Lloyd’s 
Register Group’s principal business in the maritime domain is the classifi-
cation of ships.  Nevertheless, they have offered different commercial ser-
vices as well. An example is Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (LRFP), which after 
ownership changes is nowadays entitled IHS Fairplay [112]. In the IHS 
Fairplay, data on vessels characteristics and accidents of the world fleet is 
available. LRFP was investigated for example in [113].   
Lloyd’s List Intelligence, formerly known as Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence 
Unit (LMIU) is a primary provider of global commercial maritime data and 
the only provider of global shipping movements [114]. In LMIU, AIS data is 
integrated in GIS (Geographical Information System). Besides positions 
reported by AIS, GIS also displays static data sets, including maritime 
charts, showing clear harbor, coastal and waterway areas [114]. Historical 
vessel tracks along with dynamic real time reports are shown. Data is ar-
chived for 7 days online [114].  According to [115,] the classification of the 
accidents in LMIU applied to the first event that has occurred and hence 
did not include other consequences that may have happened in the same 
accident. Similar is stated in [116], where the authors were able to populate 
only the top event in their fault tree analysis. [117] found that LMIU is poor 
at picking small spills and criticized its false causality and design. Still, the 
Lloyd’s List Intelligence database remains as one of the most popular as it 
provides data on the global level.  
Other services originally provided by Lloyd’s Register are IHS Fairplay 
World Fleet Statistics, World Shipbuilding Statistics, and World Casualty 
Statistics, nowadays published in electronic format [118]. The latter is pub-
lished annually and contains a summary of reported losses and disposals of 
merchant ships. The casualty incident categories include foundered, 
fire/explosion, collision, wrecked/stranded, contact, and hull/machinery 
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[119]. Regarding individual ships, reported information include ship name, 
her flag, Gross Tonnage, year of build, casualty incident location and a 
summary of any casualty incident suffered, including the fate of the vessel 
and crew [120]. 
To support their clients, Lloyd’s Register Group also offers a service called 
ClassDirect LIVE. This online tool is available for operators of Lloyd’s Reg-
ister classed ships. The information is confidential and the operators can 
access data on ships in their fleet with a given password. Provided infor-
mation is held on the Lloyd’s Register Group’s databases. The following 
main items are offered through ClassDirect LIVE [121]: 

 Fleet particulars irrespective of Classification Society 

 Up-to-date Survey Status for all LR-classed vessels 

 Hull and Machinery Master Lists 

 Up-to-date status of Condition of Class and Memoranda items 

 Detailed Survey Histories with complete Survey Reports for at least 
12 years 

 Incident summaries which link to details of hull and machinery de-
fects 

 Details of Hull and Machinery “as built” configuration 

 Survey Checklist as used by LR Surveyors 

 ISM Code certification status for all ships, irrespective of Class 

 Access to Rules, Regulations, Classification News, Approved Suppli-
ers Lists and technical services 

 Owners/Operators of ships with the ESP (enhanced survey pro-
gramme) notation, can view “hull related” ESP survey reports 
To conclude, classification societies have information only on the ships 
under their class. The most comprehensive is data regarding vessels partic-
ulars. Accident data is only collected when a surveyor is called or whena 
failure is observed during a survey [122]. Further, the focus is on technical 
failures. This data is confidential [117] and as such not available to the pub-
lic. If advancements in technology are rapid, failure data collected from 
previous accidents will not be usable for modeling future systems. For a 
detailed risk and reliability analysis, the data from class societies might be 
insufficient.  
 
3.6 Equasis 
Equasis database combines multiple existing maritime safety related data 
sources of the word’s merchant ships. For registered users, the database is 
freely searchable online [123]. The data providers for Equasis are listed in 
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Table 6. It is stated on the Equasis web page [124] that a special attention is 
paid to the accuracy and validity of the data and that the database is being 
constantly improved.  
In Equasis, one can search information on a specific ship (based on the  
IMO number, name or the call sign) or on a specific company. The follow-
ing ship information is returned: 

 Ship information  

 IMO number  

 Name of ship 

 Call Sign 

 MMSI 

 Gross tonnage 

 DWT 

 Type of ship 

 Year of build 

 Flag 

 Status of ship 

 Last update  

 Key indicators 

 The ship is classed by (at least) one of the IACS member societies 
(Y/N) 

 The ship's flag is not on the black list of the Paris MoU (Y/N) 

 The ship's flag is on the white list of the Paris MoU (Y/N) 

 Percentage of inspections having led to a detention in last 36 
months 

 The ship's flag is not on the targeted list of the USCG (Y/N) 

 List of management details 

 IMO number 

 Role 

 Name of company 

 Address 

 Date of effect 

 Details (a link to company info) 

 List of classification status 

 Classification society 

 Date change status 

 Status 

 Reason 

 List of classification surveys 

 Classification society 
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
 Date survey  

 Date next survey   

 Details (link to ClassDirect LIVE)    

 P&I Information 

 Name of P&I insurer 

 Date of inception 
For inspections and manning, the search returns a list of previous port 
state controls including the PSC Organization, authority, the port of inspec-
tion, the date of the report, detention (Y/N), detention duration, the num-
ber of deficiencies per category and details about the statutory and classifi-
cation surveys at the time of the inspection. For passenger ships, infor-
mation on Ferry directive is provided. Also, the ILO convention by flag state 
and the working conditions and collective agreement is shown. The search 
also provides historical information about the ship such as her former 
name(s) , flag(s), classification(s) and companies. 
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Table 6. Data providers for Equasis [125] 
Category Provider 
Port State Control 
Regimes 
 
 
     
 
 
Paris MOU on Port State Control (PMOU)  
The US Coast Guard (USCG)  
Tokyo MOU on Port State Control (TMOU) 
Indian Ocean MOU on Port State Control (IOMOU) 
Private inspections Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI) Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) 
IACS Classification 
Societies 
 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)  
Bureau Veritas (BV) 
China Classification Society (CCS)  
Det Norske Veritas (DNV)  
Germanischer Lloyd (GL)  
Korean Register of Shipping (KRS)  
Lloyds Register (LR)  
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK)  
Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) 
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS) 
Associate Members 
of IACS 
Indian Register of Shipping (IRS) 
Other Classification 
Societies 
Türk Loydu (TL) 
International 
Group of P&I Clubs 
American Steamship Owners Mutual P&I Association Inc.(American 
Club) 
Assuranceforeningen Gard - Norway 
Assuranceforeningen Skuld – Norway 
Britannia Steamship insurance Association Ltd 
Japan Shipowners P&I Association 
London Steam-Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Assoc. Ltd (The Lon-
don Club) 
North of England P&I Association 
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assoc. (Bermuda) Ltd 
The Shipowners' Mutual P&I Association (Luxembourg) 
The Standard P&I Club 
The Swedish Club 
The West of England Shipowners 
UK P&I Club 
Other 
 
Green Award Foundation 
Intertanko 
Intercargo 
Intermanager 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)  
International Labour Office (ILO)  
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF)  
IHS Fairplay (IHSF) (previously Lloyd's Register Fairplay (LRF))  
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
Q88 
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4. Challenges of using data in marine 
traffic accident models 
4.1 Challenges identified in the IMISS conference 
The reporting procedures and data quality of near-misses and accidents 
were discussed in an International Maritime Incident and Near Miss Re-
porting Conference (IMISS) held in Espoo, Finland on 1-2 September 2011. 
In addition to presentations, expert workshops were organized during both 
days of the conference. Different stakeholders from the maritime domain 
were participating in the workshops. These included representatives from 
Finnish and Swedish shipping companies, representatives from Finnish 
and Swedish maritime authorities and investigation bodies, administrators 
of near miss databases, and researchers from multiple countries. An insur-
ance company representative gave a presentation at the IMISS conference, 
but did not participate in the workshop.  
The themes of the first day workshops were the barriers, the benefits, and 
the future development of near miss reporting. The results of these work-
shops can be found in [81]. On the second day, the discussion was aiming to 
find how different stakeholders can benefit from accident/incident model-
ing. The second problem was to identify factors affecting the quality of acci-
dent/incident data and to suggest improvements. Unfortunately many par-
ticipants were not familiar with what accident models mean. This might be 
because “modeling” is mostly done within science. Nevertheless, the out-
comes of such models should be known to all participants as they are often 
open for the community. This can also be one of the reasons why shipping 
companies do not benefit more from the reporting process. Data that they 
provide are used by consulting companies and sold to the same shipping 
companies. Later, discussion was directed to data quality analysis. All par-
ticipants were aware that data have to be improved and that this is an im-
portant issue. It was recognized that mistakes cumulate during the com-
plete reporting process, i.e., from reporting, collecting information, con-
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verting those into databases fields and storing them. Regarding the quality 
of the data, the main factors summarized from day two workshops were: 

 Under-reporting; the recorded data does not represent reality 

 Each database has its own taxonomy 

 Changes of taxonomies during time 

 Too strict or too wide categorization 

 Missing data – empty fields 

 Incorrect data 

 Inadequate search engine 

 Restricted or denied access 
 
4.2 Discussion on how to improve data 
This report has described various sources for marine traffic accident model-
ing. Whether a database can be seen as useful for extracting information for 
accident modeling depends on its structure and interface, but most im-
portantly on the data it contains. The former can be improved by technolo-
gy advancements including better search engines. Taxonomies can even be 
omitted if searching is possible by word. This is important as different da-
tabases have different classifications of events. Another important factor is 
allowing for multiple causes and entering information in sequence of 
events. A correct format and the fulfillment of important fields can be 
forced, but this does not mean that valid data will be entered. Mistakes 
cannot be avoided when people are populating the database, they can only 
be decreased. Also, databases typically change after some time when it is 
necessary to implement new points of view, e.g. when human factors were 
found to be the most dominating factor as accident causes or when new 
regulation is forced. Some databases just made abandon the old data and 
start populating the updated database with new data, while other transfer 
old data into a new system. From accident modeling perspective one should 
be aware of changes and be careful if going to combine old and new data. 
Having a new system does not equal improving the quality of the database. 
As already stated, much depends on data stored inside the database. Data-
bases give a framework for the data they require, however they are often led 
by what one wants to include rather than by rationalizing what can be ob-
tained in practice. To overcome this, the end users and investigators should 
cooperate when designing and populating a database.  
To analyze the data quality, we have to study reporting practices in the 
maritime industry. Reporting is an important part of the ISM code re-
quirements. In an ideal situation, all accidents and incidents would be re-
  Challenges of using data in marine traffic accident m
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ported. However, in practice this is not the case. By comparing data from 
different databases [119], it was found that the number of unreported acci-
dents makes roughly 50% of all occurred accidents. The problem is the 
worst if the casualty occurred in international waters. A rough rule of 
thumb is that only 1 % of all maritime casualties are reported in such case 
[117]. This is quite a high figure which influences the outcome of any acci-
dent assessment and must be considered when interpreting the results. 
Under-reporting was also studied in [126]. Not perceiving the value of re-
porting and time were found to be important barriers to incident reporting. 
In [117], a reason for not reporting was found to be the crews believing that 
the incident will remain as a black mark no matter how blameless they real-
ly are. It was also stated that the crews believe that owners do not want to 
know about the incident. In [86], similar barriers to reporting in Finnish 
companies were found. Thus, to increase reporting, its purpose and the 
results have to be made clear to the crew. A general argument of increasing 
safety is perhaps too abstract, especially as a direct risk-reducing effect of 
reporting is challenging to measure.  
There is an opinion that much more can be accomplished by training than 
by reporting. This is not discussed here further, but one should note that in 
either case the top management plays a key role. Every reaction to a report 
is feedback to the crew and clearly states whether management commit-
ment is true or false. If a report results in a change and an improvement, it 
is more likely that reporting will be perceived by the crew as a positive and 
effective matter. This is a good ground for safety culture development. 
When a system works within a company it is expected that data will flow to 
external databases run by authorities or third parties. As some near miss 
databases are not available to shipping companies unless they contribute to 
the database with their own reports, a trust in the maritime industry does 
not exist. So to improve the reporting process, openness and trust have to 
be improved. Near misses databases where the ship owners share infor-
mation are showing that there is a place for optimism.  
Reporting might also be increased by having an easy to use system. Con-
tribution should be facilitated by using computers, mobile phones and cam-
eras, rather than a paper format. 
So far it has been discussed how to increase the number of reports, which 
is important if the data were to reflect the reality. However, having more 
cases in the data does not automatically imply that the data is adequate for 
quantitative modeling. If one wants to model accidents, the logical way is to 
start from causes. It is questionable whether causes are assigned correctly 
in different databases, and whether they ever can be. Reason behind this is 
that casualties do not partition themselves into neat categories [117]. Thus 
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databases with ’no taxonomy’ would be a better option. The process should 
be uniform and standardized between different countries. Also, much de-
pends on the investigator and his/her perspective and accumulated experi-
ence. Biases can be avoided if two investigators with different backgrounds 
can work on each case. Further, investigators should have basic knowledge 
on quantitative risk analysis to distinct what data are important and what 
are not relevant at all. 
  Many of the existing data sources contain errors. This is especially true 
for traffic data such as the IMO number. Latitude and longitude, if known 
at all, are in many cases wrong. Many fields in databases are empty. If data 
from navigational equipment is not saved in time, necessary information is 
lost. Investigation should start as soon as possible to preserve all evidence 
and to prevent any changes in witnessing. Bridge team should be trained 
how to save navigational data recorded 24 hours prior to an accident.  
Summarizing all aforementioned, it can be said that an effort should be 
made to report all accidents and to support the reporting of near misses. In 
that case, we will have better models and thus a more realistic picture of the 
accidents and safety level of the marine traffic. Correct data should be en-
tered into databases, which can be partly forced by a suitable technical de-
sign and partly by training the people who populate the databases. Different 
databases should find a standard way of assigning causes and allowing mul-
tiple causes and sequential descriptions. Database administrators should 
try to check all available sources. Also, if an event should be included in two 
databases, it must not occur that one database contains the information on 
the event while the other does not.  
 
4.3 Discussion on how to improve modeling 
So far the various data sources and the shortcomings of data have been de-
scribed but little is said about how the data is utilized in building a quanti-
tative model. Further, some of the data deficiencies might be compensated 
or taken into account by choosing the modeling approach carefully. In this 
chapter, a brief introduction to building models from data is described, fol-
lowed by a discussion on how to improve the validity of the models given 
the data deficiencies. 
Depending on the problem to be modeled and the data available, the data 
can be utilized in the quantitative model construction in many ways. Espe-
cially in engineering and nature sciences, there are often the laws of physics 
and other knowledge on the phenomenon to be modeled available. In this 
case, the mathematical or probabilistic representation of the model is 
  Challenges of using data in marine traffic accident m
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known and data is used for determining the unknown model parameters, 
for example. Sometimes there is no knowledge on the dependencies be-
tween the model variables or even on the correct variables involved and the 
complete model has to be learned from the available data. However, the 
dataset might be so large or complex that humans cannot construct the cor-
rect model from it. In this case, machine learning techniques (see e.g [127]) 
could be used in learning the model automatically from the data.  
In a case where the data available contains information on relevant varia-
bles and the quantity of the data is not a problem either, values might still 
be missing from the dataset. The selection of the approach to handling 
missing data depends on the way the data is missing and it should be done 
with care.  Missing data can be tackled for example using only the cases 
with complete data, deleting case(s) or variable(s), applying imputation 
methods, or using model-based procedures [128].  Imputation means esti-
mating the missing values based on the other values in the dataset. For ex-
ample, the averages of the other available valid values could be used, or a 
value of a similar or almost similar case could be substituted. Model-based 
procedures include methods such as the EM-approach [129]. EM-approach 
performs two steps iteratively: Finding a model that maximizes the likeli-
hood of the given data values (E-step), and finding values for the missing 
data that maximize the likelihood of the model found on E-step (M-step). 
The values from the M-step are then used on the next E-step. 
When the amount of data is limited, one could apply Bayesian approach to 
constructing a probabilistic model. In the Bayesian approach, in addition to 
the data, prior knowledge on the possible model is taken into account (e.g. 
[130]). The influence of the prior knowledge in finding the best model is 
following the well-known Bayes theorem: 
 
ܲሺܯȁܦሻ ൌ ௉ሺ஽ȁெሻ௉ሺெሻ
௉ሺ஽ሻ
ൌ ௉ሺ஽ȁெሻ௉ሺெሻ
௉ሺ஽ሻ     (1) 
 
, where ܲሺܯȁܦሻ is the probability of a model ܯ given the data ܦ, ܲሺܦȁܯሻ is 
the likelihood of ܯ, i.e., the probability of observing the data ܦ given model 
ܯ, and ܲሺܯሻ is the prior probability of the model ܯ. Depending on the 
problem, the prior probability could describe knowledge such as expert 
opinion or the laws of physics, or it could be based on a somehow related 
other dataset.  For example, worldwide accident statistics could serve as 
prior knowledge when modeling the accident risks in the Gulf of Finland. A 
fully Bayesian approach means not choosing one model for describing the 
problem, but instead using the distribution ܲሺܯȁܦሻ over all model candi-
 52 
 
dates. On the other hand, if one wants to select only one model, the mode of 
ܲሺܯȁܦሻ could be used.  
Another way to overcome completely missing data on certain variables or 
otherwise deficient data is to combine multiple data sources which are 
somehow connected. Using multiple datasets together when building a 
model for e.g. classifying ships into accident-proneness categories might 
produce a more accurate model than using only one of the datasets alone. 
As an example, one could assume both the VTS violation report data and 
accident data provide information on ship’s safety. Some of the variables in 
these datasets are common, but they also have unique variables. Further, 
there might be ships that appear in both datasets, and then again ships that 
are included in only one of them. Ship’s safety level could be seen as a hid-
den variable that cannot be observed, but which is shared between the da-
tasets. Combining multiple sources for machine learning has many names 
depending on the dependencies of the datasets and the learning task, for 
example multi-view learning, multi-task learning, transfer learning, co-
training, and domain adaptation [131, 132, 133]. It should be kept in mind 
that whenever multiple data sources are combined, in order to have a valid 
model, the combination t should be done with extreme care [134]. 
   Conclusions 
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5. Conclusions  
Various data related to marine traffic and the accidents on the sea exist and 
the amount of data seems to grow in the future. Typically, the data has been 
collected for other purposes than for providing input to quantitative mod-
els. On the other hand, data is necessary for modeling and building a new 
database from an existing data is not an unusual practice in research. How-
ever, it is time consuming and does not present a practical solution.  
This report examined possible sources of input data for quantitative ma-
rine traffic accident models. Summary of the data sources studied in this 
report is given in Table 7.  These data sources differ in the scope and pur-
pose and they all have their strengths and weaknesses. However, using any 
of them as the only source of input to a quantitative model seems risky, and 
if factors such as underreporting, errors and missing fields are not consid-
ered, the models may produce completely unreliable results.  
To improve the models’ validity, researchers need to decrease the uncer-
tainty in the data. Double checking between two and more databases is nec-
essary prior to a model population. Also, using the data together with prior 
knowledge might help. Combining multiple related data sources when 
learning the model from data could also be utilized. 
It is much an easier task to point what is wrong and much harder to sug-
gest sound improvements possible to implement. To fulfill the task prom-
ised in the report title, a more detailed study with expert involvement is 
needed. Additionally, as ‘a quantitative marine accident model’ can mean 
many things, the true feasibility of different data sources cannot be deter-
mined without applying the data to the modeling and then validating the 
results. In the end however, all improvements in the data or its handling 
will not matter, if the databases stay unavailable to the modelers and fur-
ther indirectly to the stakeholders making the decisions based on the mod-
els. 
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Table 7. Summary of the feasibility and the drawbacks of data covered in the report 
Feasibility for accident modeling Drawbacks 
TRAFFIC 
DATA 
past ship trajectories and routes can be 
extracted from data; 
contain errors and missing fields; 
can be used in dynamic ship traffic 
system reconstruction 
 
provides information also on “safe 
ships”, not only on ships in accident or 
incidents 
large amount of data points - diffi-
cult to maintain and store 
INVESTI-
GATION 
DATA 
can be used for accident description;  
more severe accidents are investi-
gated in more detail; 
accidents with no injuries are un-
derreported; 
biases might be present during in-
vestigation; 
can be used for the analysis of causes 
data have to be extracted from 
(long) text format; 
not all data can be summarized in 
the report; 
reports are often in a national lan-
guage 
ACCIDENT 
DATA-
BASES 
information is provided in categorical or 
numerical format which can be analyzed 
statistically; 
 
factual data about ship is available; 
field for narrative part exist; 
 
establishment of common taxonomy in 
EMCIP 
different taxonomies are still an 
issue; 
often do not take into account mul-
tiple causes or describe the accident 
chains; 
missing fields and errors in data; 
do not contain all accidents which 
belong to scope of the database; 
fixed categorization; 
changes during time 
NEAR 
MISS DA-
TA 
more data compared to accident cases; 
 
provide valuable insight into causes; 
 
can be used for analysis of barriers 
no traffic data; 
no factual data except ship type; 
lot of "unimportant" cases to ana-
lyze; 
for some databases access has to be 
granted by stakeholders 
INSPEC-
TION AND 
CONTROL 
DATA 
first-hand information whether a vessel 
is at risk; 
 
technical issues and safety management 
system well covered; 
 
data give insight on management com-
mitment to safety 
data is confidential and not available 
except in case of PSC data; 
not all ships in one area are inspect-
ed in the same time interval, e.g. one 
year; 
typically there is more data on the 
“risky” ships as the inspections are 
conducted more frequently on them; 
 
human factors are not checked suffi-
ciently 
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Appendix A:  Data fields in DAMA ac-
cident database 
Field Format Field Format 
Case number number Country text 
Ship name text Waters cat 
Home port text Voyage phase cat 
Nationality text Working ac. cat 
Type of ship cat wind direction cat 
Constuction year number wind force cat 
Renovation year number sea cat 
Material cat visibility cat 
GRT number light cat 
DWT number cargo cat 
Length number Pilot onboard y/n 
Classification society text 2. ship name text 
Year number 2. ship nation text 
Month number Loss/ damage severity cat 
Day number evacuated y/n 
Time of event number Hull damage y/n 
Day of the week number Hull damage severity cat 
Event #1 cat Damage length Number 
Event #2 cat Damage width Number 
Event #3 cat Damage depth Number 
Cause #1 cat Hull damage location y cat 
Cause #2 cat Hull damage location z cat 
Cause #3 cat Hull damage location x cat 
Cause #4 cat Death persons Number 
Departure port text Injured persons Number 
Destination port text Oil pollution Number 
Latitude number Bridge manning Free text 
Longitude number Damages Free text 
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Appendix B: Categorization of acci-
dent causes in DAMA 
  External factors 
A01 Storm, nature disaster etc. 
A02 Drift caused by wind, current etc. or other maneuvering challenges  
A03 Collision with a floating object not detected or avoided on time 
A04 Failures in aids to navigation or external safety equipment 
A05 Error in navigation chart or publication 
A06 Technical fault of the other ship (incl. Tug) 
A07 Another ship acting wrongly 
A08 Technical fault in loading, unloading or bunkering equipment. Faults in pier struc-
A09 Faults in using loading, unloading or bunkering equipment. Faults in using port or 
A10 Blow-up or other external factors in oil drilling 
A11 Difficult ice conditions 
A12 Icing 
  Ship structure and layout 
B01 Insufficient structural strength 
B02 Impaired structural strength due to welding, corrosion etc. 
B03 Loss of stability due to ship structure 
B04 Inadequate maneuvering capabilities 
B05 Equipment layout / placement in the machinery room caused a leak or a fire hazard 
B06 Bad placement or layout of cargo or storage area 
B07 Bad placement or layout of other areas than the bridge 
B08 An area difficult to access for cleaning, maintenance or inspection 
B09 Other factors related to ship structure or maintenance 
  Technical faults in ship equipment 
C01 Technical fault in navigation equipment 
C02 Technical fault in steering equipment 
C03 Technical fault in propulsion system 
C04 Technical fault in auxiliary system 
C05 Technical fault in anchoring equipment / deck machinery 
C06 Technical fault in control/remote control/automatic control/warning system 
C07 Technical fault in cargo handling equipment 
C08 Technical fault in backup systems/ inert gas system/halon system 
C09 Technical fault in drilling equipment 
C10 Other technical fault 
  Appendix B: Categorization of accident causes in DA
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  Factors related to equipment usage and placement 
D01 Impractical bridge design, equipment missing or wrongly placed 
D02 Poor user interface design or placement  
D03 Placement of an equipment not suitable for operating 
D04 Unsuitable/poor/worn equipment, equipment difficult to use 
D05 Other equipment design /operation factors, man-machine interface problems 
  Cargo, cargo and fuel handling and related safety equipment 
E01 Autoignition of cargo/fuel 
E02 Inert gas system or other fire/explosion prevention system missing 
E03 Irregular stability (wrongly placed cargo, missing ballast etc.) 
E04 Cargo not properly secured 
E05 Liquid cargo leak (barrels, containers, tanks etc.) 
E06 Leaks in cargo or fuel pipes / hoses 
E07 Other factors related to cargo or fuel 
  Communication, organizing, instructions and routines 
F01 Missing/incomplete general instructions 
F02 General procedures not known/inadequately trained 
F03 Missing / incomplete safety instructions 
F04 Safety instructions known but not followed 
F05 Welding safety instructions not followed 
F06 Welding lead to fire despite following safety instructions 
F07 Emergency equipment testing and test instructions not followed 
F08 Personal protective equipment not used 
F09 Inadequate level of organizing/instructions/competence 
F10 Inspection/maintenance instructions not followed 
F11 Stability not known / no accepted stability calculations 
F12 Inappropriate management style, people problems etc. 
F13 Undermanning (missing helmsman, lookout etc.) 
F14 Unclear task responsibilities 
F15 Bridge routines not defined or defined poorly 
F16 Bridge routines not followed 
F17 Nautical charts/other publications outdated 
F18 Mistakes in cooperation with a tug, land organization etc. 
F19 Other factors related to organization, safety rules, routines or communication 
  Persons, situation assessment, actions 
G01 Unqualified for the task (education, degrees etc.) 
G02 Inexperience (work experience, water area familiarization, equipment usage etc.) 
G03 Poorly planned task/action (cargo, night navigation, route plan, anchoring etc.) 
G04 Available means for receiving a warning inadequately utilized 
G05 Alternative navigational systems not used. Lights, buoys etc. Wrongly assessed 
G06 Available navigational aids or publications not used 
G07 Position not fixed correctly 
G08 Misunderstanding of the other vessel's movement or intentions 
G09 Misunderstanding of own vessel's movement (wind, current etc.) 
G10 Tried to perform the task in unfavorable conditions 
G11 Did not stay at the correct side of the waterway/water area 
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G12 Situational speed too high 
G13 Sickness, fatigue, excessive workload etc. 
G14 Fell asleep on watch 
G15 Alcohol or other intoxicant usage 
G16 Other human failures 
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